I. INTRODUCTION One of the foundational commitments of the International Monetary Fund (IMF, or "Fund") was that it would be politically neutral. (1) The IMF has struggled to achieve neutrality, hindered by its structure and the dominance of large and wealthy nations. The pledge of political neutrality has witnessed several contradictions. First, the decision about which countries receive loans has been criticized as being motivated by political considerations. Indeed, this would seem to follow naturally from the IMF's voting system, which allocates voting power as a function of the size of a country's paid-in subscription. (2) Second, the doctrine of political neutrality has provided a questionable shield for loaning to repressive regimes? Third, the IMF has said that it will design structural adjustment policies in a politically neutral fashion, but a country's ability to implement a structural adjustment program depends in part on its political conditions. As such, political neutrality could undermine the effectiveness of IMF programs. If the IMF is tolerant of failings in some regimes and not others, the problem of political favoritism, which may accompany the decision of which countries receive IMF assistance, is compounded. The dynamic can thus be summarized: as the IMF ignores domestic politics, its programs are often unsustainable or unsuccessful in implementation. However, this blindness is coupled with a political favoritism, which may allow certain countries leeway to delay reform.