I. INTRODUCTION Over two centuries ago, Benjamin Franklin lamented, "When will mankind be convinced and agree to settle their difficulties by arbitration?" (1) Today, the merits of international arbitration are well known, at least in the commercial and investment realm, (2) so much so that Henry Campbell-Bannerman's wish might be more appropriate for the times: "Gentlemen, I fervently trust that before long the principle of arbitration may win such confidence as to justify its extension to a wider field of international differences." (3) It is debatable whether the time has arrived for arbitration to expand into such sensitive fields as arms control. Although commentators see states as tending not to want to submit politically sensitive disputes to arbitration on account of their importance to national security, (4) in fact arbitration has been used since ancient times to resolve sensitive military-related disputes and conceivably could be applied to arms control disputes notwithstanding their sensitivity. Many dispute settlement provisions in arms control agreements provide for the possibility of arbitration, though they ostensibly have not been used. This includes at least 78 IAEA Safeguards Agreements and six multilateral arms control treaties. Given that several current arms control disputes seem to have reached at least a temporary impasse (namely, those arising from Iran's and North Korea's nuclear ambitions), the stage might be set for arbitration to make its grand entry in this field.